The two-sided competitive situation where the players allocate ordnance, subject to resource constraints and limited mission time, to attack (or defense, for the opponent player) for the targets carrying some cargo of varying values is formulated as a two-sided time-sequential zero-sum game. A system of difference equations is derived which is in theory solvable recursively and determines the optimal strategies of the players. A special case of the game is completely solved. The continuous-time version of the problem is also discussed.
is paid by 11, where 0 < a,S < 1 are known constants. a is the probability that a I's attack is successful, if he attacks the target. S is the probability of failure of II's defense if he defenis the target I attacks. Since the number of weapons in hand is restricted for each player and the mission time is also limited, if a target arrives with relatively small x and relatively large n (mission time) remaining, the attacker, (and hence the defender too), will postpone expending a weapon and wait, expecting some more favorable opportunity may arrive in the future. Thus each player has to find an allocation policy which will indicate him what type targets he should attack (or defend) as a filllction of the mission time and number of weapons he has remaining on station. The problem belongs to a type of zero-sum-game version of one studied in some earlier works Albright [1] , Donis and Pollock [4] , Mastran and Thomas [6] and Sakaguchi [9, 10] . Moreover, our problem generalizes in a certain way the card game Goofspiel discussed by Ross [8] .
There are, in fact, many situations both in and out of warfare that have similar nature of "opportunity analysis" in common.
An outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we shall derive, by a dynamic programming formulation of the problem, a fundamental system of difference equations in time n to go and amount of ordnance k and R., for each player at hand. This system of difference equations, which is in theory solvable recursively, determines the optimal strategies for the players. In Section 3 the game is completely solved in the case of the deterministic target value. In Section 4 the continuous-time version of the problem is discussed. A system of differential equations is given, which characterizes the optimal strategies of the players. Some concluding remarks are given in the final section. Let r(n, k, R,) denote the game described in the previous section. (n, k, i) denotes the state of the system in which Attacker and Defender possess k and i weapons, respectively, and they have mission time n to go. Then the normalized form of the game r(n, k, i) has the matrix
if the first target appears with type x. The interpretation of aBx&r(n-l, k-l, ~-l) is that the system yields an immediate payoff aBx and then moves to the state (n-l, k-l, ~-l), given that the both players use their first pure strategy.
Let V (k, R,) represent the value of the game r(n, k,
with the initial condition Vo(O, 0) = 0. The notation val A for a matrix A is used for the value of t.he matrix game A.
In order to obtain the solution of the game, it is convenient to define the mean shortage function
We assume that 0 < \.I :: E(X) = {OO xdF(x) < "', and hence TF(z) exists. This z~ Some immediate examples of TF(Z) are :
Now let {gn,i}l~i~n be a triangular array of possitive numbers defined by the recurrence relations
j=l n,J We shall note, after the following Proposition is proved, that gii's are given in the definition (4) such that the evident conditions V (n, 0) = nail n and V (n, n) = nai31l are consistent with the relations (5b) 'V (5d). 
j=l n,J Proposition 1. The boundary conditions for the system of recurrence relations (1) are given by
This difference equation has the solution (5b). In fact, substituting (5b) into the right-hand side of (6b), we get, by (4) ,
nnnComparing (6d) with (6b), we find that (6d) has the solution (5d).
Finally, for k = nand 0 < £ < n, we have
With W (n, £) _ (I-s)-l{na).! -V (n, £)} , this becomes (1) with the boundary conditions (5a) ~ (5d), where go' s are defined by (4) 0 The optimal strategy for each player is that of n,l the matrix game in the right-hand side of (1), if a target with type x arrives in state (n, k, £).
The system of difference equations (1) with the boundary conditions (5a) ~ (5d), which is in theory solvable recursively, determines the optimal strategies for the players. We shall see, however, that finding the solution of the game explicitly even for the most elementary cdf F(x)'s, seems to be hopeless. From (1) and (5a) ~ (5d), we find, for n = 1, 
Attack Defend
To go on further to n cdf's.
3 is almost prohibitive, even for the most elementary 3. Deterministic Target Value.
Our problem gives an explicit and easy solution in the case of the deterministic target value, ~ X = 1, with probability 1. The problem in this case is clearly an extension of the inspection game in Owen [7] , and reduces to a variant of the infiltration game discussed in Thomas and Nisgav [13] . The fundamental recursive relation is given, from (1), by
with the boundary conditions
We note that, for each player, if he has n(br more) available weapons to expend in a n-days mission, then clearly he will use them all.
V (k, i) = a.k{l-{l-S)i/n} n to the difference equation (7) for the game
The optimal mixed strategies x*(k, i) and y*(k, i), for player I and IT, ~-l+W
, we obtain
The proof of (8) We conclude that in order to obtain the value of the game, each player must allocate his available weapons such that his probability of performing his action (~attack for I, and defense for IT ) is equal to the ratio of the number of his weapons in hand to the total number of the remaining periods. That is, for each player, a uniform distribution over the remainder of the time period will provide him the value of the game. Note that the optimal strategy for each player does not depend on a, 13, and the number of weapons available to his opponent.
Finally in this section we shall note that an interesting work by
Maschler [4] also studied this type of sequential games in non-zero-sum-game version.
Random Arrival Times.
In this section, we shall derive the consequences of deleting the requirement that the number of targets, and their arrival times also, are deterministically known and fixed. That is, we will consider the sequential game, investigated in previous sections, in the situation where the targets arrive sequentially one by one and randoml;r in a Poisson manner during some given time period. Whenever a target arri'res with value x each player is asked to decide whether he attacks (or defends) the target expending one 189 unit of his weapon, or does not attack preserving his ordnance for his future opportunities. We shall assume that the targets arrive in a Poisson manner with arrival rate A, and that any decision must be made immediately after the arrival time of a target --hesitation is not permitted. Thus the problem belongs to a type of two-sided-game version of one studied in some earlier works Albright [1] , Donis and Pollock [4] Mastran and Thomas [6] , and Sakaguchi [9, la] . Also a related work is found in Sweat [12] . 
, if k,t ~ 1. Rearranging terms, deviding both sides by ~t, and taking the limit as ~t + 0, we obtain a system of differential equations
with the initial conditions V k
Define the sequence of f~ctions g (t)'s by a system of differential r equations (13) g'(t) = A{TF(g (t» -TF(g l(t»}, r r rwith the initial conditions g (0) = 0, (r = 1,2, .
•. ). Clearly, (13) is a r continuous-time analogue of (4). This sequence of functions was first introduced in this field of problems by Sakaguchi in [9] 
As with any model, the models presented here are mere abstractions of reality. Thus, the major gains provided are through insights from identifying and examining various relationships among operational parameters. There are a host of extensions that could be made to the present study. In principle, the situation where both sides can expend more than one weapon in salvo can be treated in a similar fashion as in Sections 2 and 4. One must describle the model such that, if i and j torpedos are expended by Attacker and Defender, respectively, for a target of value x, then the expected payoff to Attacker is (l_qi)Sjx, where p = l-q, 0 < P < 1, is the single shot probability of hit. One must treat the fundamental recursive relationships (1) and (12) which involve (k+l)X(~+l) matrix games.
A much more difficult problem, but indeed one of interest, is the case where both sides can expend their ordnance in continuous amounts. In this case, if 0 ~ ~ ~ $ and 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ of ordnance are expended by Attacker and Defender, respectively, for a target of value x, then the expected payoff to attacker is (l_e-r~)e-s~x, where r and s are given positive constants.
Some partial differential equation describing the system will determine the optimal strategies, and will contain "continuous games on the square" (see, for example, Dwen [7; Chapter IV]), in place of matrix games in (1) and (12) .
The problem begins to take the form of a two-sided time-sequential game of optimal allocation of search efforts. See Croucher [2] , for the two-sided non-sequential deterministic-target-value version of this problem.
